The
Trumpian agenda to “Make America Great Again” emerged during the
2015–16 campaign and ensured Donald Trump’s nomination and his eventual
victory over Hillary Clinton. This counterrevolutionary movement
reflected the public’s displeasure with both the Obama administration’s
hard swing to the left and the doctrinaire, anemic Republican reaction
to it.
Although only partially implemented during Trump’s first term, maga
policies nevertheless marked a break from many past Republican
orthodoxies, especially in their signature skepticism concerning the
goal of nation-building abroad and the so-called endless wars, such as
those in Iraq and Afghanistan, that tended to follow. But like all
counterrevolutions, there were intrinsic challenges in the transition
from simply opposing the status quo to actually ending it.
There was a promising start during Trump’s first
administration. Corporate interest in a porous border to ensure
inexpensive labor was ignored; immigration was deterred or restricted to
legal channels, and the border was largely secured. Deregulation and
tax cuts, rather than deficit reduction, were prioritized. Selective
tariffs were no longer deemed apostasies from the free market, but
acceptable and indeed useful levers to enforce reciprocity in foreign
trade. Costly middle-class entitlements were pronounced sacrosanct.
Social Security and Medicare were declared immune from cost-cutting and
privatization.
This “action plan to Make America Great Again” went
hand in hand with an effort to transform the Republican Party. What had
once been routinely caricatured as a wealthy club of elites was
reinvented by Trump as a working-class populist movement. Racial
chauvinism and tribalism were rejected. Race was to be seen as
incidental to shared class concerns—notably, reining in the excesses of a
progressive, identity-politics-obsessed bicoastal elite. Athletes who
in 2020 had bent a knee to express outrage at “systemic” racism were in
2024 celebrating their scores by emulating Trump’s signature dance
moves.
Despite intense resistance from the media, the
Democratic Party, and the cultural Left, the first Trump term enjoyed
success in implementing many of these agendas. After losing the 2020
election—in which nearly 70 percent of voters in key swing states voted
by mail-in ballot—Trump left office without a major war on his watch. He
had overseen a period with 1.9 percent annualized inflation, low
interest rates, steady economic growth, and, finally, after constant
battles and controversy, a secure border with little illegal
immigration.
Yet during the succeeding four-year Biden
interregnum, the world became far more chaotic and dangerous, both at
home and abroad. Biden’s general agenda was to reverse by executive
order almost every policy that Trump had implemented. And while Trump
was successfully reelected in 2024 after reminding voters that they had
been far better off under the maga
agenda than during Biden’s subsequent shambolic tenure, the changed
conditions in 2024 will also make implementing that agenda even more
difficult than after Trump’s first victory.
Trump has now inherited an almost bankrupt country. The ratio of debt to annual gdp has reached a record high of nearly 125 percent—exceeding the worst years of World War II.
The nation remains sharply divided over the southern border, which for
most of Biden’s term was nonexistent. Trump’s own base demands that he
address an estimated twelve million additional unvetted illegal aliens,
diversity, equity, and inclusion mandates and racial quotas, and an
array of enemies abroad who are no longer deterred by or content with
the global status quo. The eight-year Obama revolution in retrospect did
not change American institutions and policies nearly as much as the
more radical four-year Biden tenure. And so often, when drastic remedies
are proposed, their implementation may appear to the inured public—at
least initially—as a cure worse than the disease.
Take
the example of illegal immigration. Since Trump left office in January
2021, two major and unexpected developments have followed during the
Biden years. First, the border did not just become porous but virtually
disappeared. Indeed, Biden in his first hours of governance stopped
further construction of the Trump wall, restored catch-and-release
policies, and allowed illegal immigrants to cross the border without
first applying for refugee status.
Given the magnitude of what followed—as many as
twelve million illegal aliens crossed the border during the Biden
tenure—the remedy of deportation would now necessitate a massive, indeed
unprecedented, effort. The public has been increasingly hectored by the
Left to fear the supposedly authoritarian measures Trump had in mind
when he called for “massive deportations.” Left unsaid was that such
deportations would only be a response to the prior four years of lawless
and equally “massive” importations of foreign nationals. And yet, while
the twelve million illegal entrances over four years were an insidious
process, the expulsion of most of those entrants will be seen as abrupt,
dramatic, and harsh. In addition, it was much easier for felons and
criminals to blend into the daily influx of thousands than it will be to
find them now amid a population of 335 million.
Second, in the 2024 election, Trump won a record
number of Hispanic voters (somewhere between 40 and 50 percent,
depending on how the term “Hispanic” is defined) in one of the most
dramatic political defections from the Democratic Party in history.
While voters’ switch to Trump can be largely attributed to the
deleterious effects of the Biden-Harris open border on Hispanic
communities, schools, and social services, no one knows what, if any,
might be the paradoxical political effects of the mass deportation of
many within these same Hispanic communities.
Will Hispanic voters continue to resent the
ecumenical nature of illegal immigration across the southern border,
which now draws millions from outside Latin America? Will they wish to
focus primarily on violent criminals while exempting on a case-by-case
basis Mexican nationals, many of whom have kinship ties to Hispanic U.S.
citizens? In sum, no one yet knows the political consequences of
deporting all—or even 5 to 10 percent—of the Biden-era illegal aliens,
given their unprecedented numbers. Even if polls tell us that 52 percent
of Americans support “massive” deportations, will that number still
hold true if they eventually include friends and relatives or entail
five or six million deportations?
Trump’s fiscal policies pose similar known
unknowns. During the 2024 campaign, Trump promised a number of large tax
cuts to various groups. For example, eliminating taxes on service
workers’ tips might cost the treasury in excess of $10 billion a year.
Trump’s call to make tax-free the incomes of police officers,
firefighters, veterans, and active-duty military personnel would
translate into at minimum a shortfall of $200 billion a year in federal
tax revenue. Another $200 billion in annual revenue would be lost if, as
promised, Trump once again allowed state and local taxes to be deducted
from federal income taxes. Some $300 billion per annum would also
vanish under Trump’s proposals to cease taxing hourly overtime pay.
Other promises to eliminate taxes on Social Security income, cut
corporate taxes to 15 percent, or reextend his 2017 tax cuts could in
toto reach $1 trillion in lost federal revenue per year.
The 2024 yearly deficit was projected at about
$1.83 trillion. So how would Trump reach his goal of moving toward a
balanced budget if all the promised tax reductions were realized, with a
yearly loss of at least $1 trillion in revenue added to the nearly $2
trillion currently borrowed each year? No one knows the precise increase
in annual revenues that will accrue from greater productivity and
economic growth due to Trump’s deregulatory and tax-reduction agendas.
Furthermore, how much income can be expected from proposed reciprocal
tariffs on foreign imports? And how much will realistically be gained in
savings from Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy’s new Department of
Government Efficiency and their promise to cut $2 trillion from the
annual federal budget?
So far, Trump’s proposed radical tax cuts are quite
popular, mostly transparent, and often detailed, while the commensurate
massive reductions in federal spending are as yet none of the above.
The political success of Trump’s tax and spending reductions will hinge
on the degree to which he can eliminate massive unpopular waste, slash
useless programs, increase federal revenue from targeted foreign
tariffs, and through incentives grow the size and incomes of the
taxpaying public and corporations—without touching sacrosanct big-ticket
items like defense, Social Security, and Medicare. It bears noting that
no prior administration has been able to cut the annual defecit while
also massively reducing federal income taxes.
Trump
has also promised a radically new and different cohort to run his
cabinet posts and large agencies. In his first term, Trump’s agenda was
stymied by both his own political appointees and the high-ranking
officials of the administrative state. Starting in 2017, they saw their
new jobs as either warping maga
directives into their own preferred policies or colluding to block a
supposedly unqualified and indeed “dangerous” Trump. Almost monthly, his
cabinet heads or agency directors—John Bolton, James Comey, John Kelly,
James Mattis, Rex Tillerson, Christopher Wray—were at odds with their
politically inexperienced president.
Anonymous lower-ranking officials routinely claimed
to the media that they were internally frustrating Trump initiatives
and leaked embarrassing (and possibly fabricated) anecdotes about their
president. One supposedly high-ranking Trump official known as
“Anonymous” —later revealed to be a rather low-ranking bureaucrat named
Miles Taylor—began a New York Times hit piece,
“I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration.” He
further boasted of how appointees deliberately tried to sabotage Trump
policies and executive orders.
But paradoxes also arise from Trump’s 2024 remedies
for this earlier internal obstruction. Given this past experience, only
genuine outsiders appear immune to the compromises and careerism
endemic among veterans of the administrative state. And yet such
would-be reformers often lack the insider knowledge, expertise, and
familiarity with the government blob needed to reduce or eliminate it.
The radical growth in the federal government, the
surge in entitlements, the increases in regulations and taxes, and the
soaring deficit and national debt were overseen by so-called experts in
the bureaucracy as well as by traditional politicians on both sides of
the aisle. In response, would-be reformers have talked grandly about the
dangers of unsustainable national debt, the interest payments that now
exceed $1 trillion per year, and the need to rein in nearly $2 trillion
in annual budget deficits. But few, especially in Congress, may be
willing to cancel the sacred-cow programs that have enriched their
constituents, provided jobs for millions of Americans, and offered
high-paying revolving-door billets for retired politicians and their
staffers.
For example, the general public, liberal and
conservative alike, acknowledges vast waste and wrongheaded procurement
at the Pentagon. Auditors quietly grant that massive subsidies and
corporate welfare to pharmaceutical companies, agribusiness, and
crony-capitalist wind- and solar-energy companies are near scandalous.
An increasing number of voters now believe that the government needs to
get out of the business of guaranteeing student loans that are
nonperforming, stop funding boondoggles like high-speed rail, and
dismantle the vast dei-commissar system at government agencies.
Yet those most familiar with these programs are
their beneficiaries. And those who could most effectively discontinue
them are precisely those who perhaps could least be trusted to do so.
Therefore, outsiders are needed, even or especially those without the
degrees and résumés customarily required to run these huge government
entities.
Trump’s cabinet nominee Pete Hegseth, for example, a
decorated combat veteran who wrote a book on the Pentagon’s
pathologies, is by conventional standards unqualified to be the defense
secretary. He is not a four-star officer, former Fortune 500 ceo,
or prior cabinet official. Unlike his two predecessors, however, he
would not revolve into the office from a post at a defense corporation
with huge Pentagon contracts.
The fbi nominee
Kash Patel has a lengthy record of government service in Congress, the
executive branch, and legal circles. But he also is a fierce critic of
the fbi and was once himself a target of agency monitoring. Indeed, Patel wrote a book about fbi misadventures, incompetence, and political weaponization. He promises to move the agency outside of Washington, D.C.,
and to end its political contamination—which has earned him fierce
opposition from within the bureau and its congressional and media
supporters.
In rejection of the Republican establishment that
obstructed him in his first administration, Trump has often opted for
anti-big-government picks who were once Democrats or who otherwise
emphatically reflect the populist nature of the new Republican Party,
such as Tulsi Gabbard (National Intelligence), Robert F. Kennedy Jr.
(Health and Human Services), Dr. Marty Makary (Food and Drug
Administration), Dr. Jay Bhattacharya (National Institutes of Health),
or Lori Chavez-DeRemer (Labor).
In sum, while it is not impossible for reformers to
emerge from the status quo, it is precisely those “unqualified,”
“firebrand,” or “dangerous” outsiders without “proper” experience in
government, without prestigious degrees and credentials, and without
sober and judicious reputations within the bureaucracies (indeed, they
are sometimes the very targets of the agencies that they are tasked to
reform or end) who are most immune to being compromised by those
bureaucracies.
But it is abroad where the implementation of the maga
agenda will be most severely stress-tested, particularly regarding
China, Russia, Ukraine, and the Middle East. Trump’s first term was
neither isolationist nor interventionist. He loathed nation-building,
but he also ridiculed the appeasement strategies of prior
administrations. Recalling the Roman military commentator Vegetius’s
famous aphorism si vis pacem, para bellum (If
you desire peace, prepare for war), Trump’s strategy in building up the
nation’s defenses and reforming the Pentagon was not to fight elective
ground wars or to democratize foreign nations, but to avoid future
conflicts through demonstrable deterrence.
A good example is his first-term experience with
radical Islamists in the Middle East. On January 3, 2020, the Trump
administration killed by drone the Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani
near the Baghdad airport. Soleimani had a long record of waging
surrogate wars against Americans, especially during the Iraq conflict
and its aftermath. After the Trump cancellation of the Iran deal,
followed by U.S. sanctions,
Soleimani reportedly stepped up violence against regional American bases
in Iraq and Syria—most of which, ironically, Trump himself wished to
remove.
A few days after Soleimani’s death, Iran staged a performance-art retaliatory strike of twelve missiles against two U.S.
airbases in Iraq, assuming that Trump had no desire for a wider Middle
Eastern war. Tehran had supposedly warned the Trump administration of
the impending attacks, which killed no Americans. Later reports,
however, did suggest that some Americans suffered concussions and that
more damage was done to the bases than was initially disclosed.
Nonetheless, this Iranian interlude seemed to reflect Trump’s agenda of
avoiding “endless wars” in the Middle East, while restoring deterrence
that prevented, rather than prompted, full-scale conflicts.
Yet in a second Trump administration, such
threading of the deterrence needle may become far more challenging. The
world today is far more dangerous than it was when Trump left office in
2021. The U.S. military is far weaker, suffering from munitions shortages, massive recruitment shortfalls, dei
mandates, and dwindling public confidence. The State Department is far
less credible, and America’s enemies have been long nursed on Biden-era
appeasement. Four years ago, for example, no one would have dreamed that
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians would become
casualties in a full-scale war on Europe’s doorstep.
Indeed, an inept Biden administration crippled U.S.
deterrence abroad through both actual and symbolic disasters. In March
2021, Chinese diplomats brazenly dressed down newly appointed
Biden-administration diplomats in Anchorage without rebuke. The debacle
in Afghanistan in August 2021 marked the greatest abandonment of U.S. arms
and facilities in American military history. Six months later, an
observant Vladimir Putin correctly surmised that a Russian invasion of
Ukraine would likely face few countermeasures from a now humiliated and
unsteady United States.
In late January 2023, the meandering and
uninterrupted week-long flight of a Chinese spy balloon across the
American homeland seemed to exemplify the general disdain enemies now
held for the Biden administration. Indeed, foreign foes assumed that
there would be few Western consequences for their aggression, at least
during a window of opportunity never before seen—nor likely to be
repeated.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorists, followed
eagerly by a ragtag mob of Gazans, stormed into Israel. They murdered,
tortured, raped, or took hostage some 1,200 Israeli victims, sparking a
theater-wide war against Israel instigated by Iran and its surrogates.
The serial Houthi attacks on international shipping
intensified to such a degree that the Red Sea joined the Black Sea, the
Strait of Hormuz, the South China Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean as
virtual no-go zones for Western shipping, given the absence of visible
American and nato deterrents. By autumn
2024, Iran had launched five hundred missiles, rockets, and drones at
the Israeli homeland, with the United States loudly enjoining
de-escalation and restraint on our Israeli ally.
By year’s end, tens of thousands of North Korean
combat troops were fighting with Russians on the Ukrainian border. And
by late 2024, the combined Russian and Ukrainian dead, wounded, and
missing had passed one million, in the greatest European charnel house
since the World War II battle for Stalingrad.
All these foreign wars and quagmires pose dilemmas for maga
reformers. Again, Trump was not elected to be a nation-builder,
globalist, or neoconservative interventionist. Conversely, he is no
isolationist or appeaser, on whose watch the world would continue to
descend into the chaos of the past four years. Yet Trump in 2024 is much
more emphatic about the need to avoid such dead-end overseas
entanglements, or even the gratuitous use of force that can lead to
tit-for-tat entanglements. That caution may obscure his Jacksonian
foreign policy and wrongly convince opportunists to test his frequent
braggadocio and purported deterrence credentials.
In this regard, Trump’s selection of J. D. Vance as
vice president and Tulsi Gabbard as director of national intelligence,
along with Tucker Carlson and the once-Democratic pacifist Robert F.
Kennedy Jr. as close advisors—
coupled with his announcements that the hawkish former secretary of state Mike Pompeo and the former UN
ambassador Nikki Haley would not be in the administration—may be
misinterpreted by scheming foreign adversaries as proof of a new
Trumpian unilateral restraint.
The Republican Party is now the party of peace, and
Trump the most reluctant president to spend American blood and treasure
abroad in memory. Trump broke with previous Republican interventionism
largely because he damned past American misadventures in Afghanistan and
Iraq that cost thousands of lives and trillions of dollars while they
distracted from an unsustainable national debt, a nonexistent southern
border, and a floundering lower-middle class. Similarly, it is no wonder
that the public often sees the use of force abroad as coming at the
zero-sum expense of unaddressed American needs at home. Moreover, a
woke, manpower-short military has disparaged and alienated the
working-class recruits who disproportionately sought out combat units
and fought and died in far-off Afghanistan and Iraq.
Recently, however, even as President Trump’s inner
circle emphasized a stop to endless conflicts, Trump himself in November
2024 warned Vladimir Putin not to escalate his attacks against Ukraine.
Yet that warning was followed by massive Russian air onslaughts against
largely civilian Ukrainian targets—and further threats of tactical
nuclear weapons deployed against Ukraine. Trump also instructed Hamas
and Hezbollah to cease their wars against Israel, and advised the former
to release the hostages, Americans particularly—or else.
Vladimir Putin no doubt took note, but he also may
have wished to encourage America’s enemies to test Trump’s Jacksonian
rhetoric against his campaign’s domestic promises to mind America’s own
business at home. So, is there a way to square the circle of neither
appeasing nor unwisely intervening?
Trump will have to speak softly yet clearly while
carrying a club. For the first few months of his tenure, his
administration will be tested as never before to make it clear to Iran
and its terrorist surrogates, as well as China, North Korea, and Russia,
that aggression against U.S.
interests will swiftly incur disproportionate and overwhelming
repercussions—in order to prevent wider wars that eventually might
require the use of much larger forces.
Ukraine is, paradoxically, a case study of both the
dangers of American intervention in distant foreign wars and the
consequences of being regarded as weak, timid, and unable or unwilling
to protect friends and deter enemies. The cauldron on the Ukrainian
border, as already noted, has likely already caused between 1 and 1.5
million Ukrainian and Russian casualties, soldiers and civilians alike.
There is no end in sight after three years of escalating violence. And
there are increasing worries that strategically logical and morally
defensible—but geopolitically dangerous—Ukrainian strikes on the Russian
interior could escalate and lead to wider wars among the world’s
nuclear powers. Joe Biden’s post-election decision to allow Ukraine to
launch sophisticated American missiles deep into the Russian homeland
was met by further Russian warnings of escalation to the use of
nuclear weapons.
Many on the right wish for Trump immediately to cut
off all aid to Ukraine for what they feel is an unwinnable war, even if
that cessation would end any leverage to force Putin to negotiate. They
feel the conflict was egged on by a globalist Left, as a proxy conflict
waged to ruin Russia to the last Ukrainian soldier. These critics see
the war as conducted by a now undemocratic Ukrainian government, without
elections, habeas corpus, a free press, or opposition parties, led by
an ungracious and corrupt Zelensky cadre that has intrigued with the
American Left in an election year. Preferring negotiations that might
cede Ukrainian territories already occupied by Russia for guarantees of
peace, they point to polls revealing that less than half of the
Ukrainian people are confident of a full military “victory” that would
restore the country’s 1991 borders.
In contrast, many on the left see Putin’s invasion
and the Right’s weariness with the costs of Ukraine as the long-awaited
proof of the Trump–Russia “collusion” unicorn and generally perfidious
Trumpian Russophilia. They judge Putin, not China’s imperialist
juggernaut, as the real enemy. And they discount the dangers of a new
Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. To see Ukraine at last defeat
Russia, recover all of the Donbas and Crimea, and destroy the Putin
dictatorship, they are willing to feed the war with American cash and
weapons—again, to the last Ukrainian.
Trump
vowed to end the catastrophe within a day by doing what is now
taboo—namely, calling up Vladimir Putin and making a deal that would do
the seemingly impossible and entice Russia back inside its pre-invasion
borders of February 24, 2022, thus preserving a reduced but still
autonomous, and even secure, Ukraine. How could Trump pull this off?
Ostensibly, Trump would be following the advice of a
growing number of Western diplomats, generals, scholars, and pundits
who have reluctantly outlined a general plan to stop the slaughter. But
how would the dictator Putin face the Russian people with anything short
of an absolute annexation of Ukraine, after wasting a million Russian
casualties?
Perhaps, after the deal, Putin could brag to
Russians that he institutionalized forever his 2014 annexations of the
majority-Russian Donbas and Crimea; that he prevented Ukraine from
joining nato on the doorstep of Mother
Russia; and that he achieved a strategic coup in uniting Russia, China,
Iran, and North Korea in a grand new alliance against the West and
particularly the United States, with the acquiescence if not support of
the nato member Turkey and an ever more sympathetic India.
And what would Ukraine and the West gain from such
an example of the Trumpian “art of the deal”? Kyiv might boast that, as
the bulwark of Europe, Ukraine heroically saved itself from Russian
annexation, as was envisioned by Putin in the 2022 attempt to decapitate
Kyiv and absorb the entire country. Ukraine was subsequently armed by
the West and fought effectively enough to stymie the Russian juggernaut
and humiliate and severely weaken the Russian military—to the benefit of
nato and EU
nations. Trump might then pull off the agreement if he could further
establish a demilitarized zone between the Russian and Ukrainian borders
and ensure EU economic help for a Ukraine fully armed to deter an endlessly restless Russian neighbor.
What would be the incentives for such a deal, and
would they be contrary to the interests of the American people or
antithetical to the views of the new Republican populist-nationalist
coalition? First, consider that if Trump were to cut all support for
Ukraine, it would likely soon be absorbed by Russia. The maga
Right would then be blamed for a humiliation comparable to the Kabul
catastrophe. Indeed, the fallout would likely be worse, since the
situation in Ukraine, unlike the Afghanistan mess, required only
American arms, rather than lives. In contrast, if the conflict grinds on
and on, at some point the purportedly humanitarian yet pro-war Left
will be permanently stamped as the callous party of unending conflict,
and seen as utterly indifferent to the Ukrainian youth consumed to
further its endless vendetta against a Russian people who also are worn
out by the war.
Both Russia and Ukraine are running out of
soldiers, with escalating casualties that will haunt them for years.
Russia yearns to be free of sanctions and to sell oil and gas to Europe.
The West, and the United States in particular, would like to
triangulate with Russia against China and vice versa, in Kissingerian
style, and thus avoid any multi-power nuclear standoff.
Trump wants global quiet in order to increase and
stockpile American munitions with an emboldened China on the horizon. He
will inherit a U.S. military budget dangerously exhausted by wasteful procurement of overpriced systems like the F-22
aircraft and the littoral combat ship, by cuts in training for troops
and maintenance of ships, and by massive aid to Ukraine and Israel.
Accordingly, Trump prefers allies like Israel that can win with a few
billion, rather than those that continue to struggle after receiving
$200 billion, as Ukraine has done.
Last, Europe is mentally worn out by the war, and
increasingly reneging on its once-boastful unqualified support for
Ukraine, as it hopes the demonic Trump can both end the hated war and be
hated for ending it.
The
same challenge of forcefully dissuading bullies while avoiding
exhausting wars will confront Trump in the Middle East. To restore
deterrence, Trump will have to put the Houthis on notice that their
attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea will earn them
something more deleterious than the Biden administration’s passive
deflections of shore-to-ship missile attacks. That passivity has so far
cost the Unites States about $2 billion in munitions without achieving
tangible results.
Iran, of course, is at the nexus of Middle Eastern
tensions. Both fear of Tehran’s missiles and the Biden administration’s
opposition paralyzed the Abraham Accords. Iran supplies all the
terrorist organizations—Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—that have
attacked Israel since Trump’s departure. Accordingly, Trump will likely
lift American restraints on Israel, supply the necessary heavy-duty
ordnance should it wish to retaliate against Iranian attacks by taking
out Iran’s nuclear program and oil-export facilities, and deter Russia
and China from intervening to help their client Iran.
In sum, to ensure that there are no theater-wide
conflicts in the Middle East, as well as in Eastern Europe and beyond,
Trump will have to use disproportionate force to dispel the image of the
United States as indifferent to aggression due to fears of costly
intervention.
The maga
revolution that will now ensue in the four years of Trump’s second and
last presidential term promises to remake America in ways only
haphazardly realized four years ago. In Trump’s favor this time around
are his past years of governance and his knowledge of the sort of
opposition he will now face—after two impeachments, five weaponized
civil and criminal court cases, repeated efforts to remove his candidacy
from state ballots, two assassination attempts, and three brutal
presidential campaigns.
The failed Biden years—the entrance of twelve
million illegal aliens through a deliberately opened border, wars
abroad, inflation, and soaring crime—helped propel the most spectacular
political resurrection in American political history. The backroom Biden
removal from the Democratic nomination, the subsequent listless Harris
campaign, and the ever more radical trajectory of the increasingly
unpopular Democratic Party have all put Trump in a far more powerful
position than when he entered the presidency in 2017 or when he left
office in 2021.
Trump’s success in resetting the United States will
hinge not merely on outwitting the desperation of his enemies, but also
on navigating the paradoxes of implementing his own maga agenda.